The Effectiveness of Antitrust Enforcement Instruments: A Matter of Agency Relation by Thépot, F
  
 
 
The Effectiveness of Antitrust Enforcement 
Instruments: A Matter of Agency Relation 
Florence Thépot 
Centre for Law, Economics and Society 
Research Paper Series: 1/2015 
Image “City of London - Topaz Adjust Exposure Correction” by Jack Torcello, used underused under CC BY 
Cropped and resized from original 
  
Centre for Law, Economics and Society 
CLES 
Faculty of Laws, UCL 
 
 
Director: Professor Ioannis Lianos 
 
 
 
 
 
CLES Research Paper Series 
1/2015 
 
 
 
The Effectiveness of Antitrust Enforcement 
Instruments: A Matter of Agency Relation 
 
Florence Thépot 
 
 
 
 
 
January 2015 
 
 
Centre for Law, Economics and Society (CLES) 
Faculty of Laws, UCL 
London, WC1H 0EG 
The CLES Research Paper Series can be found at 
www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-series 
  
All rights reserved. 
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form without permission of the 
authors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 978-1-910801-06-2 
 © Florence Thépot 2015 
Centre for Law, Economics and Society 
Faculty of Laws, UCL 
London, WC1H 0EG 
United Kingdom 
1 
 
The Effectiveness of Antitrust Enforcement Instruments: a Matter of Agency 
Relation 
 
Florence Thépot 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores how antitrust enforcement instruments modify the incentives and 
relations within companies, in the context of cartels. Among all relations, agency 
relations between shareholders and managers are the focus of this study. In the 
absence of individual liability, sanctions target the undertaking - or the principal of the 
agency relation; but not the responsible individuals - or the agent, who may engage 
the company in a cartel. Undertakings that face asymmetries of information and 
discrepancies of interests between actors may not have the ability and incentive to 
transfer a sanction to the responsible individuals. Thus, penalties that target the 
principal are deemed effective only if the company can reduce the interest gap 
internally and at low cost. Sanctions addressed to individuals in addition to 
companies, are able to impact directly the incentives of the agent of the agency 
relation. This paper argues that understanding the potential effects of competition law 
instruments on the agency relation is of utmost importance to assess their 
effectiveness to deter and detect cartel conduct. For competition policy purposes, it 
seems desirable that the agent and the principal have aligned interests towards 
sanctions. In contrast, leniency policy or bounty programmes that target the agent are 
effective if they aggravate the tension gap in the agency relation. The developments 
are based on the EU, and its member states, the US and other jurisdictions when 
relevant. 
 
Keywords: Competition law, antitrust, enforcement, leniency, sanctions, individual 
liability, bounty, agency relation, derivative actions, disqualification orders, 
asymmetry of information 
JEL Classification: K21, L4, L41 
 
  
2 
 
The Effectiveness of Antitrust Enforcement Instruments: a Matter of Agency 
Relation 
 
Florence Thépot* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Sanctions for infringing competition law are typically imposed on undertakings, while 
actors within the firm are rarely liable for engaging their companies into anti-
competitive practices.1 However, recent policy trends suggest that sanctions, 
instruments seeking to deter anti-competitive practices, increasingly target the 
incentives of individuals, in addition to the companies’ incentives. In the US, in 
December 2013, the longest prison term for breach of the Sherman Act was imposed 
in relation to price-fixing in coastal shipping; which is part of a trend towards more 
frequent and longer prison sentences.2 The UK Competition and Markets Authority is 
currently conducting a criminal investigation into the supply of galvanised steel tanks 
for water storage; where 3 individuals have been personally charged, potentially 
facing jail penalties.3 Among other EU Member States, a growing number of 
competition regimes incorporate individual sanctions; although the enforcement level 
of such sanctions remains rather low. 4 
 
Instruments seeking to detect on-going anti-competitive practices, such as leniency 
policy or bounty programmes, aim at destabilising the relations between cartel 
members by producing effects on relations that are internal to companies.5 One of 
the most striking (but non-typical) examples is given by Mark Whitacre who 
denounced his own company for participation in the lysine cartel. Mark Whitacre’s 
                                                 
*
PhD (UCL) Fellow of the UCL Centre for Law, Economics and Society; Max Planck Institute for 
Innovation and Competition (scholarship holder). This paper is based on chapter 4 of my doctoral 
thesis. I wish to thank my supervisor Prof. Ioannis Lianos for his helpful guidance on this chapter. I am 
also grateful for very insightful feedback and comments provided by my PhD viva examiners, Prof. 
Andreas Stephan and Prof. William Kovacic. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1
 For example, in EU Competition Law, undertakings are the subject-matters of competition law 
provisions and decisions sanctions are addressed to undertakings, see for example in the UK: 
Enterprise Act 2002, s 188 and 204; in the US: Sherman Act, 15 USC §1. As it will be explained 
below, many EU Member States have sanctions against individuals but the enforcement level is low. 
2
 <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2014/criminal-program.html> 
3
 See <https://www.govuk/cma-cases/criminal-investigation-into-the-supply-of-galvanised-steel-tanks-
for-water-storage 
4
 K Jones, F Harrison, ‘Criminal Sanctions: An overview of EU and national case law’ (2014) e-
Competitions N° 64713.  
5
 These instruments of course also aim to increase the cost of cartel participation and also aim at 
deterring cartel practice. 
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cooperation with the FBI, in return of which he hoped amnesty, enabled to bring 
down other related cartels in the international chemicals industry.6 
 
This paper explores how antitrust enforcement instruments modify the incentives and 
relations within companies. Among all relations, agency relations between 
shareholders and managers are the focus of this paper. Agency relations exist 
whenever a relationship between two actors – a principal and an agent - involves the 
agent making decisions on behalf of the principal. Agency relations, such as those 
existing between the owner and a manager of a company, are characterised by a 
tension of interest between the two parties due, for example, of limited information 
that enables the agent to pursue their own instead of acting in the principal’s best 
interest.7 Under certain circumstances, and depending on which actor of the agency 
relation is targeted, competition law instruments help align interests between the 
parties, while in others, enforcement instruments tend to aggravate the agency 
problem.  
 
In addition, it is posited that the assessment of enforcement instruments needs to 
learn from the effects produced on the agency relation. It seems that the assessment 
of the effectiveness of enforcement instruments seeks, in practice, to discuss which 
actor of the agency relation should be targeted. For example, most of the discussion 
around sanction policies asks whether companies (the principal), individuals (the 
agent) or both should be liable. Also, one may wonder whether competition law 
should seek to improve the agency relation, or whether it should purport to 
undermine it.  
 
Hence, it is necessary to understand that forming and sustaining a cartel involves 
different types of actors within a company. Such actors may have different interests 
with respect to cartel benefits (which depends on whether or not they are residual 
claimants of the cartel profits) or different margins of discretion (depending on their 
position within the company). This paper firstly examines different types of agency 
relations that are relevant in the context of a cartel activity, with the purpose of 
                                                 
6
 However, it seems that his actions were driven by the need to hide other criminal practice, and 
probably influenced by his mental health problems. Mark Whitacre, after exposing the cartel and 
working for 3 years with the FBI on the investigation, was eventually convicted and given a 10.5 years 
jail sentence, for other criminal infringements. 
7
 RS Pindyck and DL Rubinfeld, Microeconomics (8
th
 edn, Pearson 2013) 646. 
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understanding the role and possible motivations of different actors in the cartel 
participation.  
 
The second section will examine instruments that aim to deter anti-competitive 
practices, including sanctions that range from corporate administrative fines, to 
individual criminal penalties. The analysis will be two-fold: first, I will present the 
impact of such tools on the dynamics of the agency relation; and second, I will show 
that the effectiveness of such tools may be a matter of agency relation. That is to say, 
the assessment of such tools may consist of understanding what type of dynamics for 
the agency relation should be desired by competition law enforcers. 
 
The third section will focus on instruments that aim to detect existing anti-competitive 
practices. Leniency policy and ‘bounty’ programmes are examples of instruments that 
are designed to undermine the stability of cartels, and are deemed to constitute a 
powerful detection device for competition authorities. The ability of such programmes 
to effectively undermine the stability of the agency relation that shape cartels will be 
examined. 
 
The fourth section will analyse the ex post effects of a cartel prosecution on the 
agency relation. The effects under examination include the reaction of shareholders 
to the prosecution of their company, the way in which corporate governance may be 
reorganised and legal actions that can be initiated between various actors of the 
agency relations.  
This paper is mostly concerned with anti-competitive agreements with a particular 
focus on cartel practices, which are prohibited by Article 101 TFEU in the EU and 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act in the US.8 The restriction to cartel practices enables 
the examination of an area of competition law where the harm to economic welfare is 
unambiguous and that is homogeneously prosecutable across jurisdictions.9 
                                                 
8
 Conduct prohibited by Article 101 TFEU (EU); Section 1 of the Sherman Act 15 USC §1 (US). 
9
 Different enforcement approaches are seen in the area of vertical restraints, where the harm to 
economic welfare is particularly debated. For a background of debates and contrasted approaches to 
resale price maintenance see:  S Umit Kucuk and HJP Timmermans, ‘Resale Price Maintenance 
(RPM): The US and EU perspectives’ (2012) 19 Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 537. 
5 
 
This paper relies on a specific theoretical framework of analysis, that of the agency 
relation. This enables to limit the analysis to specific relations within the firm, the 
study of which is also supported by well-established body of theories and literature. 
Accordingly, and for the sake of conciseness, it will be mostly assumed that actors 
within the firm are somehow rational (with limitations brought by limited expertise or 
imperfect information are part of the foundations of the agency problem).10 However 
it is acknowledged and illustrated at several instances that the study of cartels needs 
to be enriched by approaches that move away from the assumption of rationality.11 
Therefore, the agency relation is here understood more generally as any mismatch of 
information and interests, and any behaviour, driven by rational or irrational motives, 
that would put the company at risk of a violation of competition. 
1.1 Agency relations in the context of forming and sustaining a cartel 
Prior to assessing the impact of policy instruments, it is important to understand the 
specificity and complexity of the agency relation in the context of a cartel practice. In 
addition to the agency relation between shareholders and managers, it is relevant to 
account for multi-level types of relationships to understand the incentives and the 
ability which various actors have to monitor cartel formation internally.12 The agency 
relations of relevance in the context of a cartel practice include the relationships 
between shareholders and managers, and that between senior-level management 
and lower-level management or employees at any level of the hierarchy. 
1.1.1  Costs and benefits of a cartel: Shareholders and managers 
It is argued that shareholders and managers have different costs and benefits of 
participation to a cartel, which causes an interest gap characteristic of the moral 
hazard problem in the agency relation. The benefits of cartel membership are 
common to shareholders and managers alike. Any increase in revenues of a 
company results in an increase in its share value and therefore benefits the 
shareholders. Managers also gain from an increase in the company’s value; the 
                                                 
10
 Following methodology of the economic analysis of law. See for example A Polinsky, A Mitchell and 
S Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law (2nd edn, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2008). 
11
 For another approach to the firm’s behaviour, which moves away from the assumption of rationality 
see for example behavioural economics – based studies: OFT1213, Behavioural Economics as 
Applied to Firms: A Primer (2010). 
12
 DH Ginsburg and JD Wright, ‘Antitrust Sanctions’ (2010) 6 Competition Policy International 3, 16. 
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extent of this gain is determined by the remuneration scheme in place. Shareholders 
may be willing to encourage managers to participate in a cartel. When the 
participation in a cartel is detected, however, the situation becomes somewhat 
different.13 In the absence of individual sanctions detection leads, in most 
jurisdictions, to administrative and/or monetary fines which are borne by the 
undertaking.14 Consequently, shareholders bear the costs of these sanctions, while 
managers may completely avoid direct personal punishment for their actions. 
Adverse reputational impacts of detection can affect both the shareholders and 
managers.15 Reputation effects may be stronger for the managers than for 
shareholders: it is more difficult to know the identity of shareholders, and dispersed 
shareholders are not supposed to have known about the cartel. In addition, detection 
may lead to the dismissal of the responsible manager, who thus personally faces a 
human capital risk. However, by the time the participation of a company in a cartel is 
detected and sanctioned, the manager responsible for it may have left the 
company.16 In this respect, Stephan points out that the average time span between 
the end of a cartel and the fine being imposed on an undertaking is in excess of five 
years.17 Therefore, a company that wants to fire or punish its managers may not be 
able to do so. In this context, the manager stands to benefit more from the 
participation in a cartel than the shareholders.18 
 
Alexander and Cohen’s empirical study provides further evidence that restriction of 
competition, as a form of corporate crime, is characteristic of the separation of 
ownership and control.19 The study examines the ownership structure of infringing 
and non-infringing companies.20 The authors collected data on the proportion of stock 
held by the top management of companies before the commencement of the 
corporate crime, and from companies that supposedly remained virtuous. Fewer 
shares being held by the top management indicates a greater separation of 
                                                 
13
 The key issue of a low probability of detection will be the object of developments below. 
14
 See the specific case of Germany where individuals are primarily liable: 1.2.2.1 (n 107). 
15
 For more discussion on the reputational impact of sanctions see 1.2.1.2.2. 
16
 C Leslie, ‘Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents’ (2008) 49 William & Mary 
Law Review 1621. 
17
 A Stephan, Should Individual Sanctions Be Part of Deterrence Efforts? ‘Deterring EU Competition 
Law Infringements: Are We Using the Right Sanctions?’ Conference by TILEC and the Liege 
Competition & Innovation, 3 December 2012. 
18
 See also: prices of shares, alexander & cohen,  
19
 CR Alexander and MA Cohen, ‘Why do corporations become criminals? Ownership, hidden actions, 
and crime as an agency cost’ (1999) 5 Journal of Corporate Finance 1. 
20
 Some of the corporate crimes highlighted in this study are cases of antitrust infringement. 
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ownership and control, and thus wider scope for agency cost, as explained by the 
theory of agency cost developed by Jensen & Meckling.21  In the econometric model, 
the dependent variable is the occurrence of corporate crime and the independent 
variable is the proportion of stock held by the top management. The study concludes 
that the rate of corporate crime is higher when top management owns less than 10% 
of the shares of the company.22 Therefore, there are more corporate crimes, 
including cartel participation, in situations of greater separation of ownership and 
control. 
 
Participation to a cartel displays another characteristic of the agency problem 
inherent to the relation between managers and shareholders, that is, a negative 
effect on the value of the firm. An empirical study has estimated the impact of an 
antitrust investigation and of a fining decision by the Commission on the value of 
companies’ shares. The results indicate an estimated loss of 1.1% in the value of 
shares on the day of the dawn raid on a company, and an aggregate estimated loss 
of 2.4% due to the investigation. To this loss must be added a further drop of 1.5% in 
the price of shares when the Commission issues its fining decision.23  
 
Therefore, when detected, the participation in a cartel deepens the interest gap 
between shareholders and managers, manifested by different costs and benefits 
towards its participation. The negative effect on the firm’s confirms that cartel 
participation is an illustration of the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders in firm where ownership and control are distinct.  
                                                 
21
 MC Jensen and WH Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 310.  
22
 The cases under examination in this study do not specifically concern situations where top 
management were personally involved in the illegal behaviour, but mostly relate to hidden actions of 
other employees. The cost related to the hidden actions of employees can be addressed with 
monitoring schemes, but cannot be reduced completely, as it is inherent to the separation of 
ownership and control. 
23
 M Motta and G Langus, ‘On the Effect of EU Cartel Investigations and Fines On the Infringing Firms’ 
Market Value’ in CD Ehlermann and I Atanasiu (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2006: 
Enforcement of Prohibition of Cartels (Hart Publishing 2006). In spite of a loss in the price of share, a 
cartel practice can still be highly profitable to the company as a whole. In addition, shareholders may 
be able to sell their shares. Especially when shareholders are dispersed, each shareholder may have 
little incentive (and even smaller ability) to prevent the participation in a cartel.   
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1.1.2 Top-level management and other managers/employees 
1.1.2.1 From the decision to the implementation of the cartel 
operation 
The relationship between top managers and other employees may also display a 
divergence of interests, in the context of cartel activity. Leslie argues that for the 
purpose of cartel operations, ‘the high-level decision makers are the principals and 
the lower-level employees are the agents who implement the price-fixing scheme.’24 
The distinction between the cartel-decision making - by the ‘principals’ - and its 
implementation by the ‘agents’, is therefore relevant. On the principal side, the 
decision to participate in a cartel typically originates from the higher level of the 
hierarchy.25 In many cartel cases, price-fixing discussions occur at trade association 
meetings, where senior managers and CEOs meet their counterparts from competing 
companies.26 On the agent side of the relationship, the decisions to participate in a 
cartel have to be implemented by lower-level management, whose role is to 
guarantee the actual return of the cartel practice for higher level management.27  By 
way of example, this agency relationship is witnessed in the citric acid cartel where,  
 
The senior executives responsible for determining the broad outline of the cartel 
agreement were nicknamed ‘the masters.’ The lower level executives responsible for 
the day-to-day workings of the cartel were ‘the sherpas’. They shared monthly sales 
figures and took stock at the end of the year of each company’s total sales.28 
 
The delegation of the operation and implementation of the cartels to lower-level 
employees intervenes for reasons similar to the delegation of a task in the classic 
agency relation. The principal employs someone who is better positioned to perform 
                                                 
24
 C Leslie, ‘Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents’ (2008) 49 William & Mary 
Law Review 1621, 1640. 
25
 A Stephan ‘See no Evil: Cartels and the Limits of Antitrust Compliance Programs’ (2010) 31 The 
Company Lawyer 231, 236. In some cases the top level of management was personally involved, and 
in other cases the top management permitted the collusion while not being directly involved. 
26 Choline Chloride  Commission Decision 2005/566/EC [2004] para 98; Citric acid Commission 
Decision 2002/742/EC [2001], para 87; Copper Plumbing Tubes Commission Decision [2006], para 
112; Industrial and medical gases Commission Decision  2003/355/EC [2002], para 105; Industrial 
tubes Commission Decision [2003], para 10. 
27 JE Harringon, ‘How Do Cartels Operate?’ (2006) 2 Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics 78, 
see table of allocation of authority. 
28
 K Eichenwald ‘US Wins A Round Against Cartel,” New York Times, 30
th
 January 1997, in MC 
Levenstein and VY Suslow, ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’ (2006) 44 Journal of Economic 
Literature 73. 
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a task, be it for his specialised expertise or the time that he can dedicate to such a 
task. In the context of a price-fixing cartel, it seems logical that sales divisions 
specialised in business decisions related to pricing are very often involved in the 
operation of the cartel.29    
1.1.2.2 Personal goals pursued by the agent 
With the objective of pursuing personal goals, an employee may decide not to comply 
with the cartel implementation instructions. In the context of a cartel operation, the 
agent maximises the principal’s value if he implements the cartel agreement, under 
strict confidentiality, which includes not keeping hard evidence of any meetings and 
refraining from exposing the cartel to the authorities. In some cartel cases, some 
agents have been ‘faithless’ to their principal as they failed to comply with the 
instructions emanating from the high-level executives, due to the pursuit of personal 
goals.30 The cartel between the auction houses, Sotheby’s and Christie’s provides an 
example, where Christie’s CEO responsible for the implementation of the cartel in 
practice on behalf of his chairman, generated a huge amount of evidence, in spite of 
a promise not to leave any written notes related to the secret meetings he was 
holding with his counterpart.31 His personal goal was to gather the maximum amount 
of incriminating evidence on the illegal practice, as a potential source of bargaining 
power against his own company, and as a way of ensuring protection through an 
immunity scheme should the cartel be detected and prosecuted.32 The lysine cartel 
provides another example of a faithless agent in the context of a cartel operation.33 
Mark Whitacre, a corporate executive of one of the cartelist companies, ADM, kept a 
                                                 
29
 ‘Sales managers and pricing specialists possess the knowledge about prices, costs, sales history, 
etc., needed to reach an agreement as to who will bid for what job or what price will be set for what 
goods.’   RR Faulkner, ER Cheney, GA Fisher, WE Baker, ‘Crime by Committee: Conspirators and 
Company Men in the Illegal Electrical Industry Cartel, 1954-1959’ (2003) 41 Criminology 511.  
30
 C Leslie (n 24) uses the expression of faithless agent to refer to employees that are weak links in 
the cartel organisation, therefore not maximising the principal value by adequately implementing the 
cartel agreement. 
31
 The collusion was prosecuted both in the US and in the EU. EU decision: Fine Art Auction Houses 
(Case COMP/E-2/37.784) Commission Decision IP/02/1585 [2006] 4 CMLR 90;  
US decision: DoJ, Decision of 2 May 2001, press release available at 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8128.htm>. 
32
 C Mason, The Art of the Steal (GP Putnam’s Sons, 2004) 246. 
33
 The lysine cartel occurred in the mid-1990s when 5 companies fixed the price of the animal feed 
additive lysine. The sanctions imposed by the US authorities included a total of $105 million fine, and 
jail sentences for some executives. The final US legal decision: US v Michael D Andreas and Terrance 
S Wilson, 216 F3d 645 (2000). The EU Commission issued an infringement decision in 2000 and 
imposed a total of €110 million fine. Amino Acids (Case COMP/36.545/F3) Commission Decision 
2001/418/EC [2000] OJ L152.   
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significant amount of evidence of the price-fixing practices, which he thought would 
attract the investigation’s attention to the case of the cartel being detected. By doing 
so, he was pursuing his own interest, which was to dissimulate other illegal activities 
that he was undertaking at the time. He hoped that the evidence provided and his 
cooperation in the cartel investigation would impede the FBI from discovering his 
other crimes.34 It also seems that Mark Whitacre suffered from mental illness at that 
time, which may also explain his behaviour against his firm.35 Therefore, due to the 
impossibility of fully controlling the behaviour of each actor, diverging interests 
towards cartel participation, be it on rational or less rational grounds, may complicate 
the implementation of a cartel agreement.  
1.1.2.3 Alignment of interests 
However, as Leslie argues, the company can easily align the incentives between the 
cartel decision makers and those who are responsible for implementing the cartel.36 
Firstly, the corporate culture conveyed from the senior management in the company 
surely explains the natural cooperation of employees with the senior management, in 
implementing price-fixing behaviours. In some companies, price-fixing may have 
been considered as an accepted practice in the past. In such companies, long 
tenured executives are more likely to maintain the habit of engaging in price fixing, 
whilst the lower layers of management merely conform to the prevalent culture of the 
company.37 In that situation, employees may find it natural to comply with price-fixing 
instructions in the same way as they would comply with any other business 
instruction. For example, one of the companies of the lysine cartel, ADM, fired an 
employee who refused to cooperate with the cartel operations.38 In the electrical 
equipment cartel, a vice-president at General Electric admitted having used strong 
social pressure as a way to coerce executives to fix prices.39 
 
                                                 
34
 C Leslie (n 24) 1643. Mark Whitacre, after exposing the cartel and working for 3 years with the FBI 
for the investigation, was convicted of a 10.5 years jail sentence, for embezzlement.  
35
 K Eichenwald, The Informant (Random House, 2000)  390. 
36
 C Leslie (n 24) 1649. 
37 J Sonnenfeld and PR Lawrence, ‘Why Do Companies Succumb to Price Fixing’ (1978) Harvard 
Business Review 145. 
38
 J Connor, Global Price Fixing (Studies in Industrial Organization) (2
nd
 edn, Springer 2008) 141 n 7. 
39
 J Sonnenfeld and PR Lawrence (n 37) 148. 
11 
 
For the purpose of the cartel, aligning incentives consists of making the profits of the 
lower-level-managers move along those of the residual claimants of the company. 
Firstly, a company may make use of corporate governance mechanisms to make 
sure that price-fixing interests are aligned. Remuneration schemes, usually designed 
to incentivise managers to act in the shareholders’ best interests, may also 
incentivise employees to sustain a price-fixing agreement.40 Sonnenfeld and 
Lawrence, who examined some characteristics of companies within an industry 
affected by price-fixing practices, found that compensation schemes in place may 
have been a powerful tool to align the interests of senior management and 
employees in the price-fixing activity.41 In contrast, the most virtuous companies were 
compensating their sales managers via straight salary bases. The managers’ 
performance was assessed according to volumes of sales achieved, rather than 
profits and price levels.42 Therefore, in these types of compensation schemes, sales 
managers’ gains from a price-fixing agreement would not be aligned to those of the 
company.  
 
In addition, looking at the stability of a cartel, certain types of remuneration plans may 
provide managers with the incentive to sustain a collusive agreement, because they 
reduce the interest of a manager in unilaterally deviating from a collusive agreement. 
For example, stock-based bonuses may reduce the incentive for the manager to 
deviate from a collusive agreement.43 The role that such remuneration schemes may 
have played in other types of corporate crimes suggests that the adverse 
consequences produced are not typical to cartel behaviour. 
 
In general, the incentives between the company and its employees may be easily 
aligned. Employees may be loyal to their company, complying with instructions, or 
with the corporate culture conveyed. Alternatively, a company may provide incentives 
                                                 
40
 See Error! Reference source not found.. 
41
 J Sonnenfeld and PR Lawrence (n 21) 149. 
42
 Ibid 153. 
43
 See economic literature by G Spagnolo, ‘Managerial incentives and collusive behavior’ (2005) 49 
European Economic Review 150; P Buccirossi and G Spagnolo, ‘Corporate governance and collusive 
behavior’, in WD Collins (ed), Issues in Competition Law and Policy 1 (American Bar Association 
2008). Data collected on the car glass cartel, lifts and escalators cartel and marine hose cartel 
suggests that the presence of a range of performance-based and stock-based compensation schemes 
may create incentives for managers and other employees to sustain collusive agreements.  
A Petersone, ‘Managerial Compensation and Cartel Behavior’ (2010), available at 
http://dare.uva.nl/cgi/arno/show.cgi?fid=222247  
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to employees so that they benefit from a sustained price-fixing outcome financially. 
Competition policy instruments have the potential to affect relations at different levels 
within the firm. Depending on the actors considered, the agency problem operates 
either against or in favour of the cartel formation and stability. Therefore it is of the 
utmost importance to specify and identify the relation under consideration. The 
remainder of this paper will merely focus on the agency relation between managers 
and shareholders, but will consider the relation between top executives and lower 
level employees in several instances when relevant. 
1.2 Competition law enforcement instruments that aim to deter 
infringements 
Both in the EU and in the US, sanctions for breaching competition law have two 
objectives:44 that of sanctioning the illegal action, for which the infringer caused harm 
to society; and, that of preventing a future breach of competition law. The scope of 
sanctions imposed then does not just intend to repair the loss to society associated 
with the breach, but attempts to deter it by making such an action unprofitable. In the 
cases of cartels, whilst the infringement, if not punished, may be highly profitable to 
the companies, it is also highly harmful to consumer welfare. To address the 
necessity of making infringements unprofitable, competition authorities have been 
imposing increasingly higher fines on companies breaching competition law.45 This is 
consistent with Becker’s theory, which advances that wrongdoers rationally weigh up 
the benefits of the crimes with the cost of the expected sanction, prior to deciding 
whether to commit a crime. The cost of expected sanctions depends on both the 
amount of the fines and the probability of detection.46 
 
                                                 
44
 Commission guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) (a) of 
Regulation No 1/2003 [2006] OJ C2010/2, para 4:  “Fines should have a sufficiently deterrent effect, 
not only in order to sanction the undertakings concerned (specific deterrence) but also in order to deter 
other undertakings from engaging in, or continuing, behaviour that is contrary to Articles 81 and 82 of 
the EC Treaty (general deterrence). In the US a cartel conviction open the possibility for civil damages, 
and antitrust sanctions in general seek to deter anti-competitive practices. DoJ, GJ Werden, SD 
Hammond and BA Barne, ‘Deterrence and Detection of Cartels: Using all the tools and sanctions’ 
(2012). 
45
 See statistics on fines imposed by the Commission between 1990 and 2014, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf>; US: Antitrust Division 2014 Criminal 
Enforcement Update available at <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2014/criminal-
program.html>.   
46
 GS Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1968) Journal of Political Economy 
76, 169. 
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Sanction instruments range from administrative monetary fines, imposed on 
companies, to sanctions of criminal nature, targeting the individuals. I will first 
consider sanctions that are imposed on companies exclusively. In the context of the 
agency relation, corporate fines target shareholders – or the principal - of the 
company (1.2.1). Sanctions targeting the agent refer to sanctions imposed on 
individuals, ranging from monetary fines and imprisonment, to professional 
disqualification (1.2.2). This section will provide an assessment of sanctions, in the 
light of their effects on the agency relation. 
1.2.1 Corporate sanctions: targeting the principal of the agency relation 
In spite of the idea that wrongdoing committed by companies stems from the actions 
of specific individuals, in other words ‘companies don’t misbehave, people do’, 
companies are typically vicariously liable for the misconduct of individuals. This 
means that companies are liable even if they do not initiate, encourage or know of 
the individual’s act.47 In the context of competition law, companies cannot avoid 
liability for infringements undertaken by their employees. Commonly with other areas 
of law, corporate liability regimes present a number of advantages over individual 
liability. First, corporate liability seems desirable if it is very costly or difficult for 
society to enforce the law.48 The rationale underpinning the necessity of corporate 
liability, instead of or in combination with individual liability, is that companies have a 
better vision on their employee’s action, and can implement internal monitoring and 
control at a lower cost than would be incurred for society. For example, sanctioning 
companies exclusively may spare society from the potential imprisonment costs 
associated with the prosecution of individuals. Another argument relies on the 
assumption that individuals may not be rational and may be unresponsive to 
individual sanctions.49 Companies may respond to sanctions more rationally and take 
action internally to prevent their realisation. In addition, individuals may have a limited 
ability to pay a monetary fine the value of which is related to the economic harm to 
                                                 
47 A Sykes, ‘The Economics of Vicarious Liability’ (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1231. 
48 L Kornhauser, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for 
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society. Because of the possibility of going bankrupt, the expected fine for an 
individual may be below the social cost of the infringement.50 
 
In the EU, as they are the subject of competition law provisions, undertakings are the 
logical subject of sanctions that are associated with the infringement of these 
provisions. Targeting the undertaking implies imposing a sanction on the company as 
a whole, regardless of the internal dimension of the undertaking. A practical 
implication of the concept of undertaking and the single entity doctrine is that the 
principal - not the agent - of the agency relation is subject to infringement decisions. 
In the context of a company in which ownership and control are separated, such 
sanctions are borne by the shareholders of a company.51 In the relationship between 
a parent and its subsidiary, the sanction related to the infringement is also imposed 
on the parent company, provided that it exercises a decisive influence on the 
subsidiary. In other words, the principal bears part of the responsibility for the agent’s 
infringement of competition. Even though they fall within the concept of an 
undertaking for competition law purposes, parent-subsidiary relations are out of the 
scope of this paper.  
1.2.1.1 Effects of corporate sanctions on the dynamics of the 
agency relation, in the absence of individual sanctions 
Sanctions targeting the principal typically take the form of administrative or civil fines 
imposed on companies. Monetary fines imposed on companies are used to remedy 
competition law infringements, across all jurisdictions, sometimes in conjunction with 
other sanctioning tools.52 As was stated before, sanctions imposed on the principal 
may have the effect of magnifying the friction of the relationship between the 
shareholders and managers of a company. The situation of moral hazard created by 
sanctions imposed on companies exclusively, may translate into a regime that ‘hurts 
the innocent (workers and shareholders) while leaving those responsible for the 
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infringement (the managers) unscathed’.53 Similarly, such a corporate liability regime 
triggers the analogy of sanctions imposed on companies with those imposed on a 
‘whipping boy’,54 educated with a prince at the English Courts, who bore sanctions 
instead of the prince when he did wrong.55 
1.2.1.2  Parameters that affect the mismatch of interests in the 
absence of individual sanctions 
The imposition of corporate fines impacts on the agency problem between managers 
and shareholders. The scope of such an impact depends on several types of 
parameters, related to who the residual claimant of the cartel profits is (1.2.1.2.1) and 
also to the level of deterrence of corporate fines (1.2.1.2.2). 
1.2.1.2.1 The mismatch of interest depends on the residual claimant 
of cartel profits 
The scope of the mismatch of interests between managers and shareholders 
depends on who the residual claimants of the cartel profits are. Spagnolo argues 
that, due to the structure of corporate governance in Europe, shareholders continue 
to be the residual claimants of cartel profits. In that case, shareholders are the ones 
who principally benefit from the cartel profits, and they are also the ones who 
principally suffer from the cartel practice. In other words, the costs of an illegal 
practice are borne by the actors who benefit from it.56 However, consistent with 
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previous developments, this study takes the view that managers personally get a 
share of cartel profits.57 
1.2.1.2.2 The mismatch of interest depends on the probability of 
detection and level of fines 
The scope of such a mismatch of interests depends on several other parameters, 
which include the probability of detection and the level of fines. As previously 
developed, the interest gap exists only to the extent that a cartel practice is detected 
and punished. In the absence of detection, cartel benefits are likely to be common to 
shareholders and managers.58 
 
The level of fines also conditions the extent to which fines imposed on companies 
affect the agency relation between managers and shareholders. This stems directly 
from the fact that the divergence of interests is due to the existence of sanctions, as 
argued in this section. A cartel that is not detected and prosecuted does not create a 
situation of moral hazard between managers and shareholders, because benefits 
and costs are aligned. Similarly, a very low fine imposed on shareholders is not likely 
to outweigh the accumulation of benefits from participation in the cartel. As a result, 
when shareholders alone are targeted, the lower the level of fines, the narrower the 
interest gap between the shareholders and the managers. The question of the 
optimal level of fines is relevant to explain why, in practice, if the level of fines is low 
enough, its impact on the agency relation will be negligible. Based on Becker’s theory 
on crime, a sanction is deterrent if the expected fine is greater than the expected gain 
from the infringement, the expected fine being equal to the nominal amount of the 
fine discounted by the probability that a cartel is detected and prosecuted.59 Applying 
this to cartel sanctions on corporations, Wils finds that: 
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Assuming a 10% price increase, and a resulting increase in profits of 5% of turnover, 
a 5-year duration and a 16% probability of detection and punishment, the floor below 
which fines will generally not deter price-fixing would be in the order of 150% of the 
annual turnover in the products concerned by the violation.60  
 
This implies that the current level of fines imposed at EU level and in other 
jurisdictions, is substantially lower than deterrence actually requires.61 As a result, 
even after detection, the consequences of participation in a cartel do not substantially 
magnify the divergence of interests between shareholders and managers. In other 
words, the agency cost triggered by cartel participation is not of particular concern to 
shareholders. However, a broader range of parameters than just the level of fines 
required for deterrence, can determine the impact corporate fines may have on the 
agency relation. Companies being fined may suffer from reputational costs and 
depending on the level of publicity, an antitrust fine may impact the business relations 
of the company. Shareholders suffer from reputational impacts to the extent that 
reputational costs are reflected in the stock price. Managers within a firm may also 
suffer from the reputational damage associated with the prosecution of their 
company, depending on their position within the hierarchy.62 However, managers 
may have left the company by the time an infringement decision is issued, which 
mitigates the potential reputational damage they may suffer. The business model and 
ethics of a company can be questioned even in the case that a company is cleared 
following an investigation.63 Therefore, accounting for reputational impacts, monetary 
fines may have a deterrent effect even if their level is below the theoretical level of 
deterrence. As the deterrent effect determines the impact of a fine on the agency 
relation, this means that broader elements associated with the actual corporate fines 
may magnify the agency problem between managers and shareholders.  
 
In addition to factors that are specific to a company, such as the remuneration 
structure of managers, external parameters related to the types of competition 
enforcement regimes affect the mismatch of interests. In other words, if competition 
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policy regimes are capable of impacting the probability of detection and the level of 
fines, they may be able to affect the scope of the agency problem between managers 
and shareholders in the context of cartel participation. 
1.2.1.3 Effectiveness of corporate sanctions: a matter of agency 
relation. 
This section will explore the actual impact of corporate sanctions on the agency 
relation between shareholders and managers. In the absence of individual liability, 
companies are induced to incur costs to better monitor individuals, thereby increasing 
the agency costs (1.2.1.3.1). Therefore, it is argued that the effectiveness of 
corporate sanctions is determined by the nature of the agency relation. (1.2.1.3.2) 
1.2.1.3.1  Corporate sanctions: an increase in agency costs. 
A company facing vicarious liability for the wrongdoing of its employees has an 
incentive to incur costs to minimise the agency problem. In that context, reducing the 
agency problem consists of reducing the probability that a company will face the 
consequences of cartel participation. For that purpose, a company can, in the first 
instance, reduce the chance that individuals will engage in practices that put the 
company at risk. Companies can implement measures aimed at preventing 
individuals from entering into an anti-competitive agreement, by implementing, for 
example, compliance training for positions that are particularly at risk. In addition, 
companies may run internal investigations and set up reporting mechanisms, with 
internal sanctions schemes designed to increase the cost for an individual to enter 
into an illegal practice.64 The agency costs incurred solve the agency problem when 
the company is able to align incentives by punishing individuals internally, as 
described here:   
 
The corporation typically bears the brunt of tort damages or criminal penalties arising 
out of the activities of its agents or employees. Except in the most serious cases, 
culpable corporate agents are monitored and sanctioned internally: The firm may fire, 
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demote, or otherwise discipline managers or employees whose actions create 
unacceptable legal risks.65 
 
However, policing measures will be implemented only if ex ante their costs are lower 
than the expected costs of being prosecuted, which again depends on the probability 
of detection.66 In other words, the agency costs related to corporate liability that a 
company is ready to incur depend on the company’s perception of the risk associated 
with being subject to an infringement decision. This is consistent with previous 
developments with regard to the fact that the probability of detection and the level of 
fines determine the existence of an agency problem in the first place. If the probability 
of detection is very low, companies have no incentive to incur agency costs in 
monitoring individuals, because corporate liability does not increment the agency 
problem between shareholders and managers anyway. In addition to the level of the 
fine and the probability of detection, reputational damage may also constitute a 
source of risk that a company will want to avoid, even if the level of the expected fine 
is low. As a result, any potential source of risk a company is sensitive to, may induce 
a company to incur agency costs to prevent such a risk from occurring.  
1.2.1.3.2 Effectiveness of corporate sanctions: a matter of agency 
costs. 
Taking the view that the level of fine imposed is sufficiently high, or that a company is 
sensitive to any type of risk associated with a prosecution, vicarious corporate liability 
may still not induce companies to incur agency costs to prevent and punish 
individuals who enter into a cartel. The implementation of preventing and policing 
measures may have two opposite effects for a company. First, these measures may 
increase the personal cost of the wrongful act for individuals, and diminish the rate of 
crimes. Second, the implementation of measures may increase the probability of the 
detection of illegal conduct by the authorities. It is argued that a company who 
detects the wrongdoing of an agent is likely to honestly report the wrongdoing to 
relevant authorities. This is because companies may face higher penalties for not 
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reporting the illegal act of an agent. In addition, the wrongdoing of the agent may 
eventually be discovered or reported to the authority. In weighing the costs and 
benefits of implementing internal enforcement measures, a company may decide not 
to incur any enforcement costs if they expect that the costs of detection are higher 
than the expected benefit of detecting the crime internally. Taking into account the 
enforcement type of agency cost, corporate liability may produce undesired or 
‘perverse’ effects. The perverse effect of corporate liability exists even if companies 
do not systematically report all illegal practices. The mere fact that they expect an 
increased probability of detection may deter companies from implementing internal 
measures.67  
 
In addition, the effectiveness of methods employed by companies to deter and detect 
wrongdoing questions the desirability of a strict corporate liability regime. The view 
that companies have ‘effective methods of preventing individuals from committing 
acts that impose huge liabilities on them’ has been questioned by subsequent 
scholarship.68 Polinsky and Shavell argue that companies are not fully capable of 
disciplining employees. Alternative employment opportunities make the threat of 
dismissal less effective to employees. The threat of a company’s suit against 
employees is limited to the assets owned by the individual, which is likely to be lower 
than the harm caused by them.69 In addition, sanctions imposed exclusively on 
companies, may target passive actors, the shareholders, who have no oversight of 
the cartel decision-making process in practice. In large companies, especially those 
publicly listed, shareholders are widely dispersed and do not oversee the day-to-day 
activities of the firm themselves. The function of control is delegated to the board of 
directors, who themselves turn to officers to implement the day-to-day monitoring in 
managing the employees. As a result, shareholders may not be capable of 
preventing employees from entering into cartels. Their option to sell or hold shares 
depends on whether earnings from the collusive profits can be expected. That is why 
it is argued that targeting shareholders exclusively may not be efficient, especially in 
countries characterised by large publicly held companies, such as the UK and the 
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US. This is because the sanction does not harm those actually responsible for 
entering into and implementing the cartel.70 In contrast, continental Europe’s 
jurisdictions may be more responsive to strict corporate liability, as the corporate 
structure is characterised by more concentrated ownership.71 
 
Corporate liability is deemed efficient if the company is able to monitor adequately 
the behaviour of individuals, in ensuring that they act in the company’s best interest. 
If a company’s enforcement effort needs to be very costly because of a large interest 
gap in the agency relation, such a cost may not outweigh the benefits of avoiding 
corporate prosecution. In addition, the effectiveness of corporate liability depends on 
how effectively mechanisms of corporate governance reduce the asymmetry of 
information and the interest gap between the company and its agents. Corporate 
governance mechanisms may fail to address this tension of interests, as exemplified 
by the corporate scandals in Enron or Parmalat. Corporate governance schemes that 
fail to reach the objectives for which they have been designed, are not likely to be 
highly effective in preventing individuals from committing illegal acts either. In 
addition, corporate governance guidance and rules logically focus on auditing and 
financial reporting requirements, while compliance with competition law (and other 
areas of law) is ancillary to the fiduciary duty of directors.72  
 
Therefore, the design of corporate liability needs to be concerned with the interest 
gap and the manner in which companies may implement internal enforcement 
measures: ‘if the firm has different interests from its agents and cannot control them 
without cost - then simple vicarious liability may no longer be the preferred corporate 
incentive regime.’73 Individual sanctions may enable the by-passing of corporate 
governance mechanisms that have to face many different challenges other than 
competition law compliance.74 
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Conclusion on corporate sanctions in the absence of individual liability 
 Assuming that a breach of competition law benefits individuals, corporate sanctions 
aggravate the interest gap between shareholders and managers. Corporate 
sanctions are seen to be effective when they induce companies to monitor individuals 
internally, providing that such controlling costs do not create adverse effects. 
However, when companies are not able to deter and detect illegal acts perpetrated 
by individuals, individual liability may be desirable in addition to corporate liability. 
Making individuals liable may help by-pass ineffective corporate governance 
mechanisms. Sanctions imposed on individuals may also be desirable when the 
agency problem between companies and their agents is too severe.75  
1.2.2 Individual sanctions: targeting the agent of the agency relation 
Antitrust sanctions that target individuals may take the form of monetary fines, 
imprisonment penalties and disqualification from the position of director. Individual 
sanctions can be of an administrative, civil or criminal nature. Individual sanctions 
contrast with those imposed on companies as they may entail imprisonment fines. 
From a policy perspective, individual penalties may present a number of advantages 
over corporate sanctions in the way they affect the actors’ incentives.76 Individuals 
may be particularly responsive to jail sentences, while they may be less responsive to 
monetary fines due to their probable limited ability to pay a fine which corresponds to 
the total economic harm to society. Such an aspect of the discussion around the 
effectiveness is left aside in this section, as is the question around the enforcement 
cost of jail sentences over pecuniary penalties.77 
 
This section will explore the manner in which the agency relation is affected when the 
agent is liable in addition to the principal. An overview of individual sanctions 
available in the US and in the EU Member states will first be provided. 
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1.2.2.1 An overview of individual sanctions 
In the US, the original version of the Sherman Act imposed criminal sanctions on 
individuals, from fines to imprisonment penalties.78 Since 2004, an individual involved 
in a cartel can be given up to ten years in jail.79 At the EU level, sanctions are levied 
only against companies. However, individual sanctions including jail sentences can 
be imposed in a number of EU member states. In the United Kingdom, individual 
price-fixers may face disqualification, imprisonment and fines.80 Imprisonment is a 
possible sentence in Italy, Austria, Germany and Hungary, but only for bid-rigging.81 
In Germany, besides criminal sanctions in bid-rigging cases, non-criminal financial 
fines, of up to 1 million euros, may be levied against individuals.82 In the Netherlands, 
fines up to 450,000 euros can be imposed on natural persons.83 In Belgium, 
administrative fines ranging from 100 to 10,000 euros can be imposed on 
individuals.84 In Ireland, individuals are liable through the liability of the undertaking, 
and can face imprisonment penalties of up to ten years.85 In Spain, an individual who 
directly took part to the decision of collusion can be given a fine of up to 60,000 
euros.86 The Danish Competition Act entails the possibility of imprisonment and 
criminal fines for individuals involved in a cartel.87 The Portuguese Competition Act 
provides for the individual liability of directors and individuals responsible for the 
management or supervision of the areas of activity where there has been a 
violation.88 In Malta, liability of directors for failure to pay a fine or to supply requested 
information can be joined to that of the firm, and they can be sanctioned to criminal 
fines as a consequence.89 In France, Cyprus and the Slovak Republic there is a 
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possibility of prison sentences of individuals.90 The Estonian Competition Act entails 
the possibility of sanctioning individuals through fines or detention for up to three 
years.91 In the Czech Republic prison sentences of up to three years were introduced 
for individual price-fixers.92 In Latvia, infringement of competition can be sanctioned 
by up to two years imprisonment and in Romania, by between four months and six 
years imprisonment.93 In Slovenia, individuals who breach competition law while 
performing a business activity can be prescribed a jail sentence ranging from six 
months to five years.94 In Greece competition policy provides for criminal sanctions, 
including imprisonment.95 In June 2014, the Polish Parliament adopted the 
amendment of its competition act, introducing fines of up to 500,000 euros on 
managers responsible for participating in anti-competitive agreements.96 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that a fair proportion of EU Member states have sanctions 
against individuals, such provisions may not actually be enforced. With regard to 
criminal sanctions, in Ireland, 5 competition cases have been prosecuted in the 
criminal courts, 3 of which led to jail or financial sanctions against individuals.97 In the 
UK, only 2 criminal cartel cases reached court.98 Only the marine hose case resulted 
in criminal sanctions - jail sentences and disqualification orders - against the 
responsible individuals.99 The CMA is currently conducting another criminal 
investigation into the supply of galvanised steel tanks for water storage; where 
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individuals may face jail penalties.100 In other regimes, such as France, Greece and 
Romania, cartels are criminalised in a tenuous manner such that the offence relates 
more to fraud alone than a cartel offence and hence is much narrower than a true 
notion of criminal antitrust. This may also illustrate the reluctance of authorities to 
bring criminal charges against individuals.101 In France, for example, criminal charges 
against individuals are, in practice, limited to cases where there exist other types of 
infringements, such as the corruption or misuse of social assets.102 The interplay of 
criminal proceedings for which courts are competent and administrative sanctions by 
the competition authority explains the extremely rare use of criminal antitrust 
sanctions in France.103 In contrast, in Germany, criminal enforcement exists but is 
rather discrete. Germany seems to produce more criminal antitrust cases than are 
actually perceived by the public.104 Several prison sentences have been imposed on 
individuals since the introduction in 1997 of criminal sanctions against one type of 
horizontal collusion: bid-rigging.105 However, Germany is not perceived as a 
successful criminal enforcer of competition law, either internationally and nationally, 
which may be explained by very low coverage in the media of bid-rigging cases.106 
Administrative fines against individuals seem, however, more commonly imposed. As 
an example, between 1993 and 2010, the German Competition Authority has fined, 
on average, one individual for each undertaking fined.107 In the Netherlands fining 
individuals is also becoming a common practice.108   
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Therefore, the level of enforcement of sanctions against individuals depends on the 
nature of the sanction – criminal or administrative – and varies from one jurisdiction 
to another. Individuals are likely to be sensitive to the level of enforcement they 
perceive. If these are barely enforced, the existence of individual sanctions may not 
impact the agency relation in the context of a cartel practice. 
1.2.2.2 Impact of the individual sanctions on the agency relation 
The overview of available individual sanctions in the US and in the EU member 
states shows that directors and executives may be personally liable for engaging in 
competition law infringements. As a result they can no longer operate behind the 
shield of corporate liability that affects the owners of the company.109  
 
In terms of incentives, individual sanctions align the cost of detection for the 
individual with that of the company. In the absence of personal punishment, the 
responsible individual may not bear the full cost of their behaviour, unless the 
company is able to punish the individual internally, or somehow recover the fine from 
the individual by way of a damages action or a derivative suit. Introducing individual 
sanctions may reduce the moral hazard situation characterising price-fixing conducts 
in a regime of strict corporate liability. This is based on the assumption that a 
collusive practice benefits both the principal and the agent of the agency relation, and 
the cost of such behaviour depends on the liability regime attached to such 
infringements. Based on the optimal sanction theory, an individual will have to 
discount the cost of a potential individual sanction from the benefit of cartel profits. An 
agent is expected to be reluctant to implement a cartel agreement if the cost of the 
expected personal sanction is greater than the benefits of implementing the collusive 
agreement. Fearing going to jail, Wayne Brasser, an employee of ADM, refused to 
cooperate in the lysine price-fixing conspiracy in which his company was involved.110 
The availability of personal sanctions surely affected the incentive of this employee. 
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In this case, while being ‘faithless’ to the higher level of the hierarchy, the employee 
of ADM, Wayne Brasser, was indirectly loyal to the shareholders of the company by 
refusing to cooperate. This is because he perceived that he could face a personal 
sanction in parallel to that imposed on the company. In other words, the interests of 
both the employee and the company towards the potential sanction were aligned.  
 
As previously described, the implementation of a collusive agreement involves 
various agency relationships between different actors of the firm, that is, between the 
decision makers, typically at the highest level of the hierarchy, and those in charge of 
implementing the agreement, such as managers from different units of the 
companies. The introduction of individual sanctions has the potential to impact 
incentives of all such agency relationships within the company, even if not all of the 
individuals are personally liable. Managers at the top of the hierarchy are typically 
liable for the wrongdoing of the employees under their control, but in the case of 
perceived potential liability, an employee may be reluctant to implement an illegal 
agreement. As such, an individual sanction may induce an employee to be faithless 
to his direct manager, even though their incentives towards the sanctions are aligned 
with those of the company as a whole.  
 
Theoretically, the availability of sanctions directed against individuals reduces the 
interest gap in the agency relation as now both the shareholders and individuals face 
sanctions. This implies that individuals have a better incentive to act in the 
shareholders’ best interests by avoiding entering into a price-fixing agreement for 
which both the shareholders and the individuals are liable. 
1.2.2.3  Effectiveness of individual sanctions  
The impact of individual sanctions on the agency relations depends on how such 
penalties affect the incentives of individuals. Firstly, it must be stressed that a 
particular individual may react differently to the threat of different personal sanctions. 
An individual may be more responsive to the risk of serving jail terms than to the 
threat of paying criminal fines. In addition, sensitivity to a particular sanction may 
differ between individuals according to, for example, their position within the 
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hierarchy. For example, only certain individuals in a company may face the risk of 
disqualification orders in the UK.111 
 
The responsiveness of individuals to individual sanctions depends on a number of 
external and internal factors. The level of the penalty imposed and the probability that 
the illegal behaviour is detected determine the impact the sanction has on individual 
incentives and in turn on the agency relation. In addition, individuals are likely to be 
sensitive to the level of enforcement of individual sanctions they perceive. In the 
absence of actual enforcement, the availability of individual sanctions may not affect 
the relation between shareholders and managers in the context of a cartel practice.  
 
In addition to the parameters given by the optimal sanctions theory, internal factors 
may affect individuals’ responses to sanctions, and their effects on the agency 
relation. For example, the fear of being dismissed, a personal low aversion to risk, or 
the corporate culture that prevails in a given company may still encourage an 
individual to implement instructions that breach competition law, despite their 
personal liability for those acts.  
 
Another key aspect is the ability a company has to indemnify its agent in case they 
face individual sanctions. A company may commit to reimbursing any fine imposed 
on an individual, or may choose to inflate the level of compensation to foresee any 
individual penalty.  In addition, directors and officers may be externally insured 
against legal risks incurred as a result of their function, as part of Director and Officer 
Insurance (‘D&O’) liability insurances, for example.112 Indemnification or insurance 
policies can foresee covering defence costs and potential damages arising out of the 
director or officer’s function. Those costs would otherwise be funded by personal 
resources.113  
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Indemnifying or insuring individuals enables the risk of competition law breach to be 
shifted from the agent to the principal. If the company is fully capable of indemnifying 
its employees, individual sanctions may produce no effect on the agency relation in 
theory.  This means that the principal bears the entire cost of the sanction, equivalent 
to situations of strict corporate liability. The ability to compensate employees depends 
on several factors: first, the nature of the individual penalty that the individual may 
face. Monetary sanctions are easily covered by an indemnity equal to the amount of 
the fine. In contrast, imprisonment sanctions may not be as easily indemnified, 
because an individual may suffer from losses that have greater implications than just 
a financial loss.114  
 
In addition, D&O insurances or companies cannot indemnify employees for all types 
of individual sanctions they may face in their capacity as manager or director of the 
company. The UK Companies Act 2006, for example, prohibits companies from 
indemnifying against criminal fines or fines imposed by a regulatory authority to a 
director.115 In addition, D&O insurances typically do not cover fraudulent, criminal or 
intentionally non-compliant acts, or cases where directors obtained illegal 
remuneration, or acted for personal profit. Innocent directors remain fully covered by 
the insurance if they are co-defendants, even if the acts of their colleagues were 
fraudulent or intentional.116 In particular, claims in relation to antitrust cases seem to 
quite often be explicitly excluded from the scope of D&O policies.117 As a result, it is 
likely that a director who personally took the initiative of entering in a cartel cannot 
operate behind the shield of a corporate indemnification or D&O policy. 
 
Theoretical discussions about the desirability of banning the indemnification of 
employees relates to its potential effect on the effectiveness of individual 
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sanctions.118 Mullin and Snyder argue that companies should not be prohibited from 
indemnifying their employees as this triggers the risk of wrongly prosecuting 
companies that have not breached the law.119 Therefore, the impact of individual 
sanctions depends on a number of factors, such as the personal sensitivity to 
sanctions, the types and level of sanctions and enforcement, as well as the ability of 
a company to indemnify employees.  
 
As was previously mentioned, corporate sanctions are deemed to be effective when 
either there is no tension between the interests of shareholders and managers, which 
is the case for an entrepreneurial firm, or when companies can cheaply monitor their 
employees. As a result, the desirability of individual sanctions depends on the 
agency relation, as summarised here:  
Cartels are formed and run by managers. A sanction policy must affect their 
incentives. This can be accomplished indirectly by imposing sanctions on firms. 
Individual liability is necessary if either the optimal enforcement policy requires the 
imposition of non-pecuniary sanctions, or the principal-agent relationship cannot 
be shaped so as to efficiently pursue the principal’s goals.120 (Emphasis added) 
1.2.2.4 Competition disqualification orders (CDOs) in the UK 
In the UK, Competition Disqualification orders (CDOs) provide an illustration of the 
intersection of sanctions of competition law and corporate governance, the main 
concern of which is the reduction of the agency problem between shareholders and 
managers. The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA), part of UK 
Company Law, entails the possibility of directors being disqualified for acting for a 
company in cases of certain misconducts. Initially, disqualification orders concerned 
wrongdoings in insolvency and broader corporate governance contexts.121 Since an 
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amendment of the CDDA by the Enterprise Act 2002,122 such sanctions of corporate 
law can be used in the context of competition law infringements: directors can be 
disqualified if their company breaches competition law.123 
 
CDOs theoretically produce two types of effects on the agency relation. Because 
CDOs target individuals, the analysis provided for individual sanctions remains valid 
in the context of CDOs. CDOs are thus deemed to reduce the situation of moral 
hazard in cartel participation, based on the assumption that directors get a share of 
the cartel profit. In addition to the effect of the alignment of incentives, generic to 
individual sanctions, CDOs may induce companies to enhance their general 
corporate governance systems. The amelioration of corporate governance in a 
company supposedly further reduces the interest gap between shareholders and 
managers. CDOs target a specific category of individuals, those directly responsible 
for the function of corporate governance, being the directors. This implies that a 
director who failed to prevent or detect a breach of competition law is also unfit to 
ensure the corporate governance function. CDOs are expected to produce effects on 
corporate governance mechanisms, because directors may be willing to control the 
company’s business more closely. Criteria to assess the unfitness of a director 
whose company breached competition law consider not just the actual but also the 
constructive knowledge of the violation. Recent changes in the OFT guidelines on 
CDOs confirm that directors who do not know about the conduct but who ought to 
have known, are not less likely to be disqualified than those who actually knew. In 
other words, directors cannot operate behind the shield of an absence of knowledge 
of the illegal conduct, if they ought to have known.124 This places greater onus on a 
director to investigate internally potential violation of competition law.125 
 
As a result, in order to avoid being personally liable, directors have to put in place 
monitoring mechanisms that corroborate with the objectives of corporate governance. 
In practice, directors may be induced to put in place compliance programmes, 
internal reporting systems and so on, and have to pay greater attention to any 
suspicious information, including abnormal profits made in a particular department of 
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the company.126 Such compliance programmes are deemed to be in the long-term 
interest of shareholders if they reduce the risk of directors engaging in cartels.127 
Directors need to be aware of compliance with competition law, in the same way that 
they are conscious of other corporate governance requirements. As previously 
developed, CDOs are circumscribed to a breach of competition and to the conduct of 
the director related to that breach. Therefore the impact of CDOs on the quality of 
corporate governance may be mitigated by the fact that CDOs do not statutorily 
consider competition law violation in the light of breach of a director’s duties. If this 
was the case, directors would need to accept that compliance is inherent to a 
director’s duties.128  
 
Similar to other types of individual sanction, the effect of CDOs on the agency 
relation depends on the ability to compensate a director. If a director is close to 
retirement, an early retirement package or generous severance package may be 
sufficient to mitigate the potential effect of CDOs on the agency relation.129  To date, 
there has been one case of directors’ disqualification in relation to a breach of 
competition law, in the context of the Marine hose cartel prosecution. However the 
disqualification was ordered in relation to a separate provision of the CDDA, which 
allows disqualification if a director has committed a criminal offence. In that case, the 
directors were found guilty of a criminal cartel offence. 130 
 
To conclude, ‘the disqualification of company directors involved in cartels provides 
the possibility of aligning the incentives of directors and undertakings, to comply with 
cartel laws.’131 A study commissioned by the OFT on the deterrent effect of 
competition law enforcements suggests that CDO is perceived as one of the most 
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powerful deterrent instruments, together with reputation cost and fines.132 Individuals 
targeted by CDOs are characterised by a high level of education and experience, 
which may explain why there are a number of stories of individuals being promoted or 
employed shortly after being convicted.133 Therefore, the threat of being banned from 
the profession may compensate for the inefficiency of the social stigma for certain 
high-profiles executives.134 As Hughes argues, a fuller use of sanctions of corporate 
governance in the context of competition law would enable an even greater place for 
competition compliance among a director’s other duties.135 
1.2.3 Conclusion on instruments aimed at deterring infringements of 
competition law 
The effectiveness of whom to target – either the principal or the agent in addition to 
the principal – depends on parameters of corporate governance.  
 
The possibility of targeting the agent exclusively is typically excluded on grounds that 
relate to the agency relation. Wils describes here the moral hazard issue that would 
arise if companies were completely relaxed about the infringement of their 
employees: 
 
If companies were not liable for the antitrust infringements engaged in by their 
employees, serious incentive problems would result. Because companies benefit from 
the antitrust infringements engaged in by their employees, companies would have an 
incentive to encourage violations. Companies would have an incentive to recruit 
those employees most likely to engage in antitrust infringements, and to give them 
the authority necessary to do so. Companies would have an incentive to impose on 
their employees profit targets or performance goals and incentive structures that 
pressurize their employees into committing antitrust infringements. Companies would 
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also have an incentive to develop internal cultures conducive to antitrust 
infringements.136 
 
Overall, a sanction policy will not be efficient if it creates a situation of moral hazard 
between the agent and the principal that the firm cannot address internally. If an 
individual operates behind the shield of corporate liability, he may not act in the best 
interest of the company as he himself does not face the risk of detection. If 
corporations cannot address this internally, increasing the level of the corporate fine 
may not be optimal in terms of deterrence. Conversely, the reason for which it would 
not be satisfactory to punish individuals exclusively is that companies would operate 
behind the shield of individual liability, because only the individual faces the risk of 
detection of the infringement. 
 
As a result, the discussion on the optimality of sanctions is merely a matter of whom 
to target among the agent and the principal. Companies repeatedly involved in cartel 
practices are likely to be large corporations, formed of many business departments 
and various subsidiaries, where shareholders have limited oversight of the managers’ 
actions. In those types of companies, the agency problem between shareholders and 
managers cannot be easily overcome. Therefore, individual sanctions have the 
overall effect of reducing the interest gap between responsible managers and 
shareholders who have no oversight of the cartel decision-making process. This is 
based on the assumption that it is in the long-term interest for shareholders that the 
company complies with competition law. In addition, individual sanctions have the 
potential to undermine the manner in which employees implement cartel-related 
instructions emanating from their managers.137 Therefore, individual penalties are 
particularly deterrent if they create agency problems in the relation between the 
employees and their managers, which in turn consists of aligning incentives of the 
agency relation between shareholders and managers. In the light of their overall 
effect on the agency relation, this study takes the view that individual sanctions are 
desirable.  
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1.3 Enforcement instruments that aim to detect infringements 
This section will focus on instruments that, in addition to contributing to increasing the 
cost of cartel participation, purport to detect existing anti-competitive practices. 
Leniency policy and ‘bounty’ programmes are examples of instruments that are 
designed to undermine the stability of cartels, and are deemed to constitute a 
powerful detection device for competition authorities.  The effect of such programmes 
on the stability of the agency relation will be examined. 
1.3.1 Overview of leniency policy 
Leniency policy is a core public enforcement instrument, adopted unanimously in the 
US and in the EU competition laws. Leniency policies contribute to the fight against 
cartels, an illegal activity which is typically carefully concealed by its participants and 
which competition authorities have difficulties in uncovering.  
 
The competition policies of all of the EU member states have leniency programmes, 
apart from Malta.138 For the purpose of this section, leniency is understood as a 
‘catch-all’ term referring to all types of immunity and reduced fines available in the 
various competition regimes.139  
 
In the jurisdiction of the European Union the term ‘leniency’ refers to immunity as well 
as a reduction of any fine which would otherwise have been imposed on a participant 
in a cartel, in exchange for the voluntary disclosure of information regarding the cartel 
which satisfies specific criteria prior to or during the investigative stage of the case.140 
 
Total immunity from fines can be granted to the first undertaking that brings 
convincing evidence of its participation in a cartel. Companies that do not qualify for 
full immunity can still benefit from a reduction in fines, if they can provide evidence 
that adds ‘significant value’ to the investigation. The reduction in the fine for the first 
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company meeting these requirements ranges from 30 to 50% of the total amount that 
would have been imposed. Subsequent applicants can claim a reduction of up to 
20%.141 In contrast, the US leniency programme only grants immunity to the first 
undertaking that reports the cartel.142 Both leniency programmes entail the possibility 
of immunity when the cartel is undetected or when an investigation has already 
started. In both cases, immunity is conditional on the prompt termination of the cartel 
activity as well as to the full cooperation of the firm. The scope of leniency varies from 
one jurisdiction to the other, to adjust for the sanctions that individuals may face. 
Some programmes grant immunity from fines to corporations while providing a 
blanket immunity to all of the employees that may face personal sanctions.143 In the 
EU, consistent with the absence of individual sanctions, the leniency programme 
grants immunity exclusively to the undertakings.  
 
For the purpose of this analysis, the most relevant aspect of leniency lies in its 
interaction with individual sanctions. In addition to corporate leniency programmes, 
some competition policies have a leniency scheme for individuals, which enables 
individuals to seek amnesty or reduction of personal sanctions independently from 
their company. The US incorporated an individual programme of leniency in 1994. An 
individual who is the first to report the cartel can be amnestied from any criminal 
sanctions he would have faced.144 The United Kingdom established an individual 
leniency programme in 2008, from which an individual who self-reports can benefit 
separately from their company, provided that the cartel conduct was unknown to the 
CMA. However, this does not guarantee immunity for other individuals of the firm or 
for the company.145 In the Netherlands, the introduction of  individual fines in 2007 
was coupled with the establishement of an individual leniency scheme. The rules for 
the scope of the amnesty or fine reduction disregard whether the applicant is a 
company or an individual. If the undertaking applies for leniency, individuals can be 
‘co-applicant’ in cooperating with the application made by the company.146 In 
Germany, natural persons have been able to seek leniency since 2006 which 
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automatically applies to the company and other individuals, unless specified 
otherwise.147 To date, there is  no reported experience of an individual benefiting 
from immunity while his company is prosecuted.148 
1.3.2 Impact of leniency policy on the agency relation 
 
The primary goal of leniency policy is to undermine the stability of relations between 
cartel members. Unstable by nature, the longevity of cartels stems from the ability of 
cartel members to sustain a certain stability in their relationships. Cartel relationships 
may be sustainable if cartel participants are able to monitor each other, and if the 
cost of a retaliation strategy prevents a member from unilaterally deviating from the 
agreement. Therefore, leniency strategy intends to weaken such cartel relationships, 
by rewarding companies that self-report.149 Well-designed, leniency programmes are 
expected to trigger a race in applications to competition authorities, while bringing 
highly valuable evidence to competition authorities during the cartel investigation. Ex 
ante, leniency policy may reduce the expected cost related to the detection of the 
cartel, as such an instrument results in immunity or the reduction of fines.150 The 
impact on the ex ante decision to form a cartel will not be considered here, as the 
focus is on the detection of ongoing cartels. 
 
The effect which leniency policy has on the internal dimension of the firm depends on 
several parameters. Some parameters stem from the competition policy of a given 
jurisdiction, in particular, whether individuals may face sanctions. 
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1.3.2.1 Corporate leniency policy: targetting the principal of the 
agency relation 
Turning to the effect which leniency has on the internal dimension of the firm, it is 
argued that one needs to take into account the ‘discrepancy between individuals and 
the undertaking’ to assess the effectiveness of leniency programmes. 151 In addition, 
issues of asymetry of information within companies may also complicate the process 
of leniency application, thereby affecting the effect of leniency on the internal 
relations. 
 
In competition regimes that strictly target companies, leniency programmes logically 
only give immunity to companies. As previously stated, in the absence of individual 
sanctions, individuals may be able to reap benefits from their cartel participation 
without bearing the cost of its detection. The availability of a corporate leniency 
programme may not affect the individual incentives as it does not affect the 
employees’ payoffs, while the termination of a cartel means the individual  can no 
longer benefit from the cartel profits.152 Therefore, if leniency policy makes a cartel 
collapse, the individual will be worse-off. If such an individual is reluctant to terminate 
the cartel or to cooperate with the investigation process, a tension of interests 
between the company and its employees can arise. The interest gap will also depend 
on the extent to which the guilty manager, on which the company heavily rely for the 
cooperation with competition authorities, may use leniency against its company.153 
For exemple, a guilty manager may condition its cooperation to a substantial pay rise. 
In addition, issues of asymetry of information within the firm may hinder the leniency 
application process: leniency applications are filled by executive members of the 
board of directors, who may not have participated themselves in the cartel conduct. 
In complex corporate structure identification of  the participants, the exact duration of 
the cartel activity and whether all activity was actually terminated at the time of the 
application may be difficult information to gather. Therefore, weighing the costs and 
benefits of leniency application may lead to another outcome than that of a race to 
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the competition authority.154 Leniency applications in Europe are often only received 
once the cartel failed – which may reflect the lack of consequences of leniency for the 
responsible individuals, as well as internal asymetries of information that complicate 
the process.155 Thus, the actual achievement of cartel detection by leniency policy 
has been questionned.  
 
Now, the case will be considered, where individual sanctions are available, or where 
a company is able to punish internally the responsible individual when the cartel is 
detected. Any instrument that potentially increases the probability of detection and 
cartel termination may be detrimental to the individual. This is because leniency does 
not protect such an individual from the internal sanctions they may face afterwards. 
Therefore, if the application for leniency is in the hands of such individuals, they may 
try to avoid it in the first place. As a result, individuals will never seek to report the 
cartel. The sanction suffered by the individual is irrespective of whether their 
company or another one blows the whistle, or whether the cartel is detected by the 
competition authorities. In such circumstances, corporate leniency that does not also 
protect individuals may not generate a race in application because responsible 
individuals do not benefit from it personally. Therefore, one should consider the 
extent to which  individual incentives in self-reporting parallel those of the company to 
understand the effectiveness of leniency policy. A policy implication is that the 
introduction of individual sanctions may hamper the effectiveness of leniency 
programmes, unless they adequately protect the individuals.156 The issue is quite 
relevant in the EU, where individuals cannot be prosecuted at EU level but still face 
the threat of individual conviction in their member state.157  
 
If corporate leniency policy also protects all the employees of the company, the 
incentive for individuals to report the cartel is deemed to be aligned with that of the 
company. For example, the UK competition regime grants a ‘blanket’ immunity to 
former and current individuals of the company.  
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1.3.2.2 Individual leniency policy: targetting the agent of the agency 
relation 
Leniency programmes that contain an individual scheme produce a completely 
different effect on the incentive an individual has to self-report. Individual leniency 
provides amnesty for an individual in distinction from his company.  
 
Firstly, individual leniency can address the tension of interests that can arise between 
the company and the individuals if they are not protected by corporate programmes 
of leniency. If the individual can join their application to that of the company, their 
incentives to self-report and to cooperate with the competition authority parallel that 
of the company. In that context, individual leniency programmes address the 
discrepancy of interest previously described. 
  
Secondly, individual leniency can be granted to the individual of the company, 
without protecting his company. The possibility of a company being prosecuted as a 
result of an individual initiative to self-report has the potential to induce huge tensions 
of interests within the company. An individual wishing to benefit from leniency has to 
provide very valuable evidence to the competition authority. Evidence secured 
typically includes information regarding other persons responsible for initiating and 
implementing the cartel. Similar to corporate leniency which enables the competition 
authority to prosecute other companies, individual leniency may trigger the conviction 
of other persons in the company. This is added to the sanction that the company as a 
whole faces.  
 
Individual leniency destabilises the agency relations within the firm, between those 
who initiate the cartel and those responsible for implementing it. The cost of 
operating a cartel is increased, as individuals need to ensure that others do not 
unilaterally report the cartel activity to the authorities. An employee may need to be 
bribed in exchange for promising not to blow the whistle.158 Game theory insights 
teach us that the expectation about each other’s reasoning is supposed to trigger an 
internal race to individual leniency applications. Expecting that individuals are likely to 
apply for individual leniency and depending on the degree of awareness, top 
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executives then have every incentive to apply for leniency at the corporate level. 
Therefore, Hammond expressed that phenomena, stating that: ‘The real value and 
measure of the Individual Leniency Program is not in the number of individual 
applications we receive, but in the number of corporate applications it generates’159 
As such, individual leniency seeks to undermine the horizontal relationships between 
cartel members, through the effect it has on (vertical) relations within the firm.160  
 
The potential impact of individual leniency on the agency relation needs to be 
nuanced. The prospect of being amnestied induced Mark Withacre to uncover the 
lysine cartel and to cooperate with the FBI. As a result of his action other executives 
received jail sentences, and a $100 million was imposed on his company ADM. In 
addition, Mark Whitacre’s cooperation enabled to bring down other related cartels in 
the international chemicals industry.161 However, it seems that his actions were 
driven by the need to hide other criminal practice, and probably influenced by his 
mental health problems. Mark Whitacre, after exposing the cartel and working for 3 
years with the FBI on the investigation, was eventually convicted and given a 10.5 
years jail sentence, for other criminal infringements.162 Outside these particular 
circumstances, personal consequences are likely to considerably reduce the 
incentive for an individual to apply for leniency against his company, especially if 
amnesty could be obtained through a corporate leniency application. (see 
developments about bounty programmes). 
1.3.3 Bounty programmes 
Bounty or whistle-blower programmes are another instrument aimed at destabilising 
the agency relations in companies, which in turn ought to undermine cartel stability. 
Whistle-blower programmes typically grant protection to individuals coming forward 
with information on a cartel, while not necessarily being involved in the cartel 
themselves. Individuals reporting the wrong-doing of third-parties need to be 
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protected from possible retaliation from other individuals, and probable dismissal by 
the company who may be convicted following an individual’s action. In addition to 
individual protection, bounty programmes incentivise individuals with financial 
rewards. Only a few competition regimes include whistle-blower programmes.163 In 
the UK, the CMA may grant a reward of up to £100,000 to an individual who brings 
valuable evidence of the existence of a cartel in which he does not take part.164 In 
Korea, the Cartel Informant Reward Programme provides a financial incentive of up 
to 2 million US dollars to an individual coming forward with information on cartel 
existence.165 In Hungary, an individual reporting private information about a cartel 
may be granted at least 1% of the fine eventually imposed (but no more than 50 
million forints, the equivalent of about £150,000).166 The introduction of a whistle-
blower programme which protects an innocent third-party that denounces a cartel is 
currently being discussed in the US. In the current bill, no financial reward will be 
provided for individuals.167 
 
The impact of bounty programmes on the relevant agency relations resembles that of 
individual leniency. Bounty programmes have the potential to undermine the stability 
of agency relations that exist in the operation of the cartel. The prospect of a financial 
reward may provide an incentive to an individual to report that outweighs the 
incentive to comply with cartel instructions. Also, the availability of a bounty may 
trigger a race to the authority just to avoid the benefit of the programme being 
captured by other employees. The necessity to collect evidence in exchange for a 
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financial reward further undermines cartel agency relations.168 In addition, the 
particularity of bounty programmes with respect to leniency programmes is that 
individuals not directly liable for the cartel may use the threat of reporting. For 
example, an employee may find in the possibility of reporting the cartel a source of 
bargaining power to obtain a pay rise. This may create or aggravate agency 
problems that are not specifically related to the cartel operation.169 Bounty 
programmes may increase the situation of moral hazard in the cartel operation ex 
post, while ex ante aligning the incentive of the informant individual with the long-term 
interest of shareholders, providing that they do not benefit from the cartel in the long-
run. 
 
However, the ability of bounty programme to undermine the agency relation within 
the firm strongly depends on its design. In addition to a sense of loyalty that exists 
between employees and their company, duties of confidentiality may reduce one’s 
incentive to report an illegal conduct. In addition, the act of whistleblowing is 
associated with considerable personal risks such as dismissal, problems of re-
employment and also carries consequences for the family, personal and social life.170 
Tragic consequences of whistleblowing is exemplified by the story of Stanley Adams, 
who reported to the European Commission illegal price-fixing practices undertaken 
by its company Hoffman-La-Roche in 1973. Following his act, he was sued in 
Switzerland for having disclosed confidential business information, faced retaliation 
measures from his company, became bankrupt, and his wife reportedly committed 
suicide in response to the conviction of her husband of a long jail sentence.171 To 
counterweight possible huge personal costs, the reward for whistle-blowers must 
amount to a lottery win, and legal protection must be adequate.172 Therefore, bounty 
programmes may destabilise the agency relation only if they provide positive and 
defensive incentives that are strong enough to trigger a very peculiar and risky 
action.173 
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Conclusion of section 1.3 
 
The effectiveness of instruments that seek to detect cartels depends on their effective 
impact on agency relations within the firm. Corporate leniency programmes are 
deemed not to be effective if there is a discrepancy of interest in applying for leniency 
between the shareholders and the managers. In contrast, the potential value of 
individual leniency and bounty programmes stands in their ability to destabilise stable 
agency relations in companies which are part of a cartel.  
1.4 Ex-post: impact of competition law infringement decisions on the agency 
relation 
1.4.1 The reaction of shareholders 
It is expected that shareholders do not receive favourably infringement decisions 
imposing high levels of fines on their companies. The reasons for the potential 
reputational damages and the impact on the value of the shares have been 
previously explained. In some cases, shareholders publicly expressed their 
discontentment regarding the illegal acts of individuals in their companies, or were 
expected to do so. Following the conviction of ThyssenKrup for participation in the rail 
cartel in Germany, shareholders publicly expressed their disapprobation to managers 
for the harm the infringement created to the company.174 During the annual general 
meeting, a number of the shareholders called for the resignation of the chairman of 
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the supervisory board, for his implication in the price-fixing scandal, and for other 
failed investments. He subsequently decided to step down from his position.175  
 
In 1996, following the conviction into several price-fixing scandals, including the 
lysine cartel, shareholders’ reactions brought about significant changes in the 
corporate governance structure of ADM. The number of external or independent 
directors on the board was increased, and directors’ compensation levels were 
drastically reduced. The changes in corporate governance coincided with the end of 
a series of price-fixing scandals for ADM.176 
 
However, it is not always the case that companies take disciplinary steps towards top 
executives involved in anti-competitive infringements. While in 1999 Robert Koehler 
was given a personal fine of $10 million for participation in the graphites electrode 
cartel, he remained at the position of CEO of the company SGL until his retirement in 
2014.177 In addition, British Airways promoted to the company’s board one of the sale 
executives allegedly involved in the fuel surcharge cartel case, a few weeks before 
he was due to appear in court, potentially facing a jail sentence.178 One of the 
possible reason explaining the lack of action is the constraint imposed by the capital 
market. Dismissing executives or taking any legal action is likely to send signals of 
uncertainty with possible negative effect on the share of the price.179 
1.4.2 Derivative actions: competition law concerned with the agency 
problem? 
In some cases, shareholders make use of a derivative action against top executives 
to recover from an antitrust fine imposed on the company. Derivative actions or suits 
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are available in almost all EU Member states, in different variations.180 Experience 
with derivative actions is particularly developed in the US and the UK, while 
remaining quite rare in continental Europe jurisdictions.181 This section will look at the 
manner in which the possibility of shareholders recovering from antitrust fines has 
been considered in the US and the UK. 
 
The US state of Delaware admitted the possibility of shareholders bringing a law suit 
against directors for failure of oversight. In Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing 
Co,182 shareholders brought a suit against directors subsequent to the conviction of 
Allis-Chalmers for a price-fixing violation. Shareholders claimed that, having not 
implemented an internal monitoring scheme, directors should be liable for the 
antitrust violation as it resulted in failure to oversee the employees’ price-fixing act. 
The Supreme Court of Delaware relaxed the directors, finding they were entitled to 
rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates unless ‘something occurs to put 
them on suspicion.’183 Refusing to impose a duty for directors to ‘install and operate a 
corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing’ the Supreme Court’s 
judgment opens the possibility that a director’s duty includes a duty to monitor.184 In 
re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
specified that the necessary condition of directors’ liability is to establish their lack of 
good faith which consists in ‘only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to 
exercise oversight-such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable 
information and reporting system exists.’185 Endorsing the re Caremark standard, 
Stone v. Ritter narrowed the condition to directors liability, requiring to showing that 
directors either ‘utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or 
controls’ or if they ‘consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus 
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their 
attention.’186 In American Inter-national Group, Inc. v. Greenberg the court inferred 
the lack of good faith from knowledge of the director’s high-level in the managerial 
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hierarchy, finding that it was unlikely that illegal bid-rigging in the insurance market 
would have occurred without their knowledge.187 In Robert F. Booth Trust v. Crowley 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed that a derivative action could also be 
brought in relation to the violation of Section 8 of the Clayton Act provision on 
interlocking directorates.188   
 
The recent case Safeway v Twigger raised the question of the availability of a 
derivative action in the context of an antitrust infringement in the UK. Following the 
imposition by the OFT  of a £11 million fine for illegal price-fixing behaviour in the 
dairy products market, Safeway brought a derivative action before the High Court 
against former employees supposedly responsible for the cartel practice.189 Relying 
on the principle of ‘ex turpi causa non oritur actio’, the former directors and 
employees applied for the claim to be struck out by the High Court. According to this 
principle, a legal action cannot be brought in relation to the claimant’s own illegal 
act.190 The High Court dismissed the defendants’ application to strike out the claim. 
The Court considered that the illegal price-fixing conduct was the act of the directors 
and/or employees acting as agents for the companies. As such, the illegality came 
from the Defendant’s acts, rather than from the companies’ personal actions. As a 
result, the Court considered that the claimants had a chance to defeat the defence’s 
argument based on the ‘ex turpi causa non oritur actio’ principle at the trial.191 The 
High Court judgment opened the possibility that companies, in spite of being the 
subject of the Competition Act provisions and liable for their infringement, could, in 
some cases, be ‘innocent victims’ of the hidden action of individuals in the context of 
the breach. In other words, this judgment would enable companies to use a device of 
corporate governance as a way to address issues of the agency relation.  
 
The High Court interim judgment was subsequently appealed by the defendants to 
the Court of Appeal. In its judgment, The Court of Appeal struck out Safeway’s claim 
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against its former directors. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that, based on Section 36 
of the Competition Act 1998, a company is liable for the violation of competition law 
prohibitions by its employees or directors. Therefore, the illegal action could not be 
attributed to individuals of the company because ‘[t]he whole hypothesis of the 
undertaking’s liability is that it is personally at fault’192 This contrasts with the High 
Court’s approach that Safeway could not be ‘personally’ at fault unless it could be 
shown that the former directors were the ‘directing mind or will’ of the company. The 
High Court rejected Safeway’s subsequent application to appeal the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment. 
 
While the High Court’s interim decision seemed to open the possibility of a company 
bringing a derivative suit in the context of a breach of competition law, the Court of 
Appeal reaffirmed that UK competition law applies to an undertaking strictly, 
disregarding the issues of corporate governance. The alternative conclusion would 
have implied that competition law is newly concerned with the relationship between a 
company and its executives. The availability of a derivative action in the context of 
the breach of competition law would have been the recognition that competition law 
violations need to be addressed along the line of other corporate governance issues.  
The circumstances of Safeway v Twigger were quite unusual, because Safeway was 
not seeking to recover the penalty from the directors themselves, but from its D&O 
insurers.193 In addition the action was brought after the company had been acquired 
by a rival supermarket, which makes the legal action slightly outside the scope of 
intra-company relations. For all these reasons, together with the capital market 
uncertainty that such legal action may trigger, it seems quite unlikely that the 
possibility of a derivative action will arise again in the UK. In addition, some have 
argued that such the possibility of having derivative actions could have had adverse 
effects on other competition law instruments, such as leniency or settlement policies. 
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In fear of being sued by their company, executives may be deterred from cooperating 
in the context of leniency or a settlement procedure because such cooperation may 
increase the potential for a derivative action against them.194 Similar concerns are 
and typically expressed in relation to potential adverse effects of damages claims195 
and individual sanctions.196 
1.5 Conclusion 
Understanding the potential effects of competition law instruments on the agency 
relation is of utmost importance to assess their effectiveness to deter and detect 
cartel conduct. Instruments that target the principal of the relation are deemed 
effective only if the company can reduce the interest gap internally and at low cost. 
Instruments that target the agent of the agency relation, in addition to the principal, 
affect this interest gap. For public policy purposes, it seems desirable that the agent 
and the principal have aligned interests towards sanctions. In contrast, leniency 
policy or bounty programmes that target the agent are effective if they aggravate the 
tension gap in the agency relation.  
 
In some cases, the reaction of shareholders following the prosecution of their 
company exhibits a mismatch of interests between shareholders and managers. 
Considering the possibility for shareholders bringing a derivative action against 
responsible managers consists in examining whether shareholders can make use of 
corporate governance tools to remedy cartel infringement. Following the Safeway – 
Twigger case in the UK, it seems that, competition law in the EU remains inclined to 
disregard agency issues and tools that address those.  
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